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INTRODUCTION

The control of exports in order to protect national interests is subject to a
"frightful labyrinth" of laws and regulations. 1 The motive for enacting these
2
laws varies: some are enacted to satisfy United States treaty obligations,
3
some for national security reasons, and others for humanitarian considera
4
tions. Further complicating matters, these laws issue from multiple
*

J.D. May 2006. Many thanks to Amy, Maggie, and Sean. I am particularly indebted to
Tim Fort for inspiration on the topic, and to Rebecca Eisenberg and the participants of the Fall 2005
Student Scholarship Workshop for hours of scrutiny and suggestions.
I.
Cecil Hunt, Overview of U.S. Export Controls,
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003, at 15 (2003).

in

P RACTICING LAW INST., COPING WITH

2. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 710--722
(2005), implement the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-856 (codified at 22 U.S.C.§§ 6701--Q771 and in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.), which in tum implements the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Produc
tion, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.
3.

See, e.g.,

Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app.§§ 1-44 (2000).

4. For example, export of thumb cuffs and other restraint devices such as straight jackets is
prohibited without a license to all countries other than Canada. 15 C.F.R.§§ 742.7(a)(4), 744 supp.
l (2005).
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5
sources. At times, the enabling legislation has lapsed only to be cobbled
6
back together by interim legislation or by Executive Order. The result is a
legal regime where "it can be difficult to find and piece together applicable
7
law."
The criteria for determining sanctions for violations of export controls
have been similarly vague. Consider, for example, the determination of
sanctions for violations of the export controls for dual-use technologies
technologies and products that "can be used both in military and other stra
tegic uses . . . and commercial applications"-set forth in the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR). Enforcement of those controls falls to
9
the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) at the Department of Commerce.
In the event of a suspected violation, BIS has three options. At the extremes,
it may either refer the case to the Department of Justice for criminal prose
cution or issue a letter of warning. In the middle, it may pursue an
10
administrative enforcement case. If the case is severe enough to merit
criminal prosecution, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide some
"
guidance on the determination of penalties. There has been little guidance
on appropriate punishment in cases that are not severe enough to merit
criminal prosecution-those cases where administrative penalties are appro
priate. Until recently, the extent of published guidance has been the
maximum administrative sanctions found in the EAR, with no explanation
12
of intermediate levels of sanctions falling short of the maximum.
The Department of Commerce has recently acted to provide clearer pen
alty guidance. On September 17, 2003, BIS proposed amendments to the
EAR in order to provide guidance on "how BIS makes penalty determina
tions when settling administrative enforcement cases" for violation of the
13
EAR. BIS then incorporated that proposed rule into a final ruling on Feb
14
ruary 20, 2004. As a result, the EAR now include a supplement at 15
C.F.R. § 766 that, for the first time, provides government criteria for setting
5. The three most significant agencies are the Department of Commerce (dual-use tech
nologies), the State Department (military weapons), and the Treasury Department (financial exports
and broad-based embargoes that cover more than exported goods). Hunt, supra note I, at 16--18.
6.

Id. at 16--17.

7.

Id. at 15.

8.

15 C.F.R.§ 730.3 (2005).

9.

Id.§§ 730.1, 730.9.

10.

Id.§ 766 supp. I; see also id.§ 764.3.

11.

18 U.S.C. app.§§ 2M5. I -.2 (2000).

12. The EAR provide that "a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 may be imposed for each
violation, except that a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 may be imposed for each violation
involving national security controls imposed under section 5 of the [Export Administration Act]." 15
C.F.R.§ 764.3(a)(l )(i) (2005).
13. Export Administration Regulations: Enforcement and Protective Measures, 68 Fed. Reg.
54, 402 (proposed Sept. 17, 2003)(to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 764 and 766).
14. Export Administration Regulations: Penalty Guidance in the Settlement of Administra
tive Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 7867 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 764 and
766).
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a penalty in these administrative proceedings.
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The penalty guidance is

largely advisory. In fact, in publishing its penalty guidance, BIS included a
disclaimer that the guidance was not binding on any party-even itself.

16

Nevertheless, the guidance is significant for three reasons. First, it is the
only published scheme for determining an administrative punishment for
EAR violations, and therefore it likely would be persuasive to an adminis
trative law judge presiding over an administrative enforcement action.
Second, since many administrative cases are settled with BIS, it will repre
11
sent the de facto penalty detennination method in many such cases. Third,
the guidance is infonnative since it reflects BIS's institutional experience
about what factors have been relevant to determining penalties in the past.
The new penalty guidance sets out six "general factors" for determining
appropriate sanctions, then lists eight aggravating factors and nine mitigat
18
ing factors.
The general factors BIS will consider are: degree of
willfulness, the destination involved, the commission of related violations,
the commission of multiple unrelated violations, the timing of the settle
19
Of the eight listed
ment, and any related criminal or civil violations.
aggravating factors, three are to be given "great weight": making a deliber
ate effort to conceal the violation, demonstrating a serious disregard for
compliance responsibilities, and "the sensitivity of the items involved and/or
20
the reason for controlling them to the destination in question." Of the nine
listed mitigating factors, two are to be given "great weight": voluntary self
disclosure of the violation and the company's having an effective export
21
.
compliance culture.

15.
Id. at 7870 (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 766 supp. 1 ) ("[I]n view of the importance of
this rule, which represents the first comprehensive statement of BIS's approach toward these issues,
BIS sought and considered public comments . . . .") .
16. Id. ("Th is guidance does not confer any right or impose any o bligation regarding what
penalties BIS may seek in litigating a case or what posture BIS may take toward settling a case.
Parties do not have a right to a settlement offer, or particular settlement terms, from BIS, regardless
of settlement postures BIS has taken in other cases.").

1 7.

Id.

18.

Id. at 787 1 -72.

Ex port Administration Regulations: Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations
in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases, 15 C. F.R.§ 766 su pp. 1 (2005). By "timing of
the settlement" BIS indicates that the longer a violator waits to settle, the greater the penalty the
bureau will seek. Id. at I ll.A ("BIS has an interest in encouraging early settlement and may take this
interest into account in determining settlement terms.").
19.

20. Id. at I ll.B. The other aggravating factors are: likelihood of the type of harm the EAR are
designed to prevent, the quantity or value of the exports, the presence of other violations of law that
do not fall under the purview of BIS, prior bad acts by the ex porter, and the extent that exports com
prise the business of the firm in question. Id.
2 1 . Id. The other mitigating factors are: whether the violation was a single e pisode of good
faith misi nterpretation, whether BIS likely would have approved the action anyway, a bsence of prior
similar acts, cooperation in the investigation, cooperating in the investigation of other parties, a b
sence of likely harm of the type that the EAR are su pposed to prevent, and general inex perience
with export licensing. Id. The guidance directs the ex porter to the Ex port Management System
Guidelines, U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., EXPORT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM GUIDELINES (2005),
available at http://www. bis.doc.gov/complianceandenforcement/ExportManagementSystems.htm,
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This Note argues that this last factor-the effective export compliance
culture-should be the first step in the analysis rather than a mere mitigating
circumstance to be considered after weighing all the other factors. Instead of
first considering what BIS describes as the general factors and then mitigat
ing for the presence of an effective compliance program, the degree of
culpability should be determined through examining the culture of compli
ance, tempered by considering the other general factors. Part I argues that
the nature of export control enforcement requires extensive self-governing
behavior on the part of exporters and that enforcement should be directed
toward that end. Part II examines several possible justifications for penaliz
ing a business entity and concludes that deterrence and rehabilitation
through education are the most viable, particularly in a self-regulating in
dustry. Part III argues that examining the export compliance program is
actually a necessary prerequisite to determining the general culpability re
quired under the general factors, and on that basis alone cannot be relegated
to a mitigating factor. Part IV argues that an emphasis on corporate compli
ance programs in punishment is the most effective route to deterrence and
rehabilitation. Finally, Part V argues that findings from the field of corporate
social responsibility indicate that the creation of a culture of compliance
focused on executive accountability is most likely to result in effective con
trols.
I. SE LF-RE GU LATI N G RE QU I REMENTS OF EXPORT CONTROLS
This Part argues that export controls rely largely, in fact almost entirely,
on self-regulatory behavior by exporters. This is a result of the export regu
lations themselves, as well as the enforcement resources available to BIS
and the small percentage of exports that require a license. Although BIS
provides some level of after-the-fact enforcement, the primary effort is to
prevent violations through education and guidance.
Only a small fraction of total United States industrial exports-four per
22
Given then that ninety

cent by one estimate-require a BIS export license.

six percent of exports do not require licensing, and that BIS, like any gov
ernment agency, must economize the use of its enforcement resources, the
Department of Commerce cannot reasonably be expected to place an agent
at the site of every export transaction to watch over the shoulder of industry
and ensure perfect compliance.
Industrial exports can now occur at almost any location in the United
States, yet BIS export enforcement field offices are located at only nine lo
cations, with each field office providing enforcement supervision over a

devel oped by BIS as a model of a c orporate c om pliance program. The EMS wil l be c onsidered m ore
fu lly in Part V.
22.

Cecil Hunt,

Department of Commerce Export Controls, in

CONTROLS 2003, at 90 (2003).

COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT
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specified region.
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Although these field offices provide on-site enforcement

abilities, there are significant export hubs that are not serviced by an on-site
enforcement team, including Seattle, San Diego, and New Orleans. And
while the chosen enforcement locations are sensible, any small firm could
hypothetically commit an illegal unlicensed export by placing handcuffs in a
24
padded envelope and mailing them to Turkey.
The complicated nature of the export license process itself makes dili
gent efforts at self-regulation all the more necessary. When contemplating
an export, it falls to the exporter to determine whether an item is restricted
and what steps to take thereafter. In fact, the EAR confront an exporter with
a total of at least twenty-nine steps that must be taken to determine how to
25
If, in just the very first step, the exporter incorrectly determines

comply.

whether this is an item "subject to " the EAR, the exporter might ignore the
rest of the process and the export will proceed unless some outside force
26
intervenes. The licensing process itself is triggered only upon an applica
27
tion by the exporter, which comes at step twenty-six of the process. An
error in the preceding twenty-five steps, or the failure to comply with step
twenty-six, could effectively remove the Department of Commerce from the
equation.
Of concern to both BIS and industry, the definition of the term "export"
has expanded to include many activities that do not fit the traditional de
scription, making it even harder to predict when and where controlled
exports will occur and to dispatch a government regulator to oversee the
process. The so-called "deemed export" rule provides that the release to a
foreign national of technology or software source code that would otherwise
be subject to the EAR is deemed to be an export of the technology in ques
28
For example, by this

tion to the country of origin of the foreign national.

standard it would be deemed an export to China to allow a Chinese profes
sor visiting at a research university hundreds of miles from the nearest
border to "visually inspect" technology that is covered by the EAR
including the object itself, plans, blueprints, schematics, or specification

23. See BIS Program Offices, http://www.bis.doc.g ov/about/programoffices.htm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2006). The field offices are l ocated in B oston, New York, Washington, Miami, Chicag o,
Dallas, San J ose, L os Angeles, and H ouston.
24. See 15 C.F.R. § 774 su pp. I (2005 ) (C ommerce C ontrol List Categ ory OA982). Restraint
devices, a crime-c ontrol c ontrolled ex port listed under Category OA982, require a license for export
t o any c ountry other than Canada "[i)n support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of
human rights through out the world . . . ." Id. § 742.7.
25.

See id.

§ 732. 1 .

26. See id. § 732 supp. I. One w ould be excused for inc orrectly thinking this is an easy
questi on . For an ex planati on of h ow nuanced that first questi on can be, see Hunt, supra n ote 22 ,
§ 3(d). For exam ple, an item can be subject t o the E AR even if it is l ocated outside the United States
and is being reexported by foreign nationals if there is U.S. c ontent exceeding a de minimis thresh
old of either ten percent or twenty-five percent by value. Id. § 3(d )( I).
27.

15 C.F.R. § 732.4(b )(7 ) (2005 ).

28.

Id. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii ).
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29
sheets. Admittedly this construction of the controls might be a necessary
reflection of the changing nature of the ways that damaging items and tech
nology can leave United States control. The point is that requiring on-site,
prior inspection of every export is simply impossible.
BIS recognizes this self-regulating nature of export controls in its ap
proach to business. Beginning in 1991, BIS initiated the Business Executive
Enforcement Team town-hall meetings. BIS engages in dozens of preventa
30
with the stated purpose of increasing export
31
control compliance through education. BIS attributed a twenty percent in

tive training sessions annually,

crease in the number of deemed-export license applications in fiscal year
2003 to improved education and outreach on its part-not to increased
32
numbers of deemed-exports. The bureau also attributed an identical twenty
percent increase in deemed-export license applications in fiscal year 2004 to
33
The logical inference is that some significant fraction of the

outreach.

deemed-exports in fiscal years 2002 and earlier were unlicensed simply be
cause nobody ever applied for a license, perhaps out of ignorance.
Finally, there is empirical evidence that erratic fluctuations in export li
censes in recent years reflect the hit-or-miss nature of enforcement. In fiscal

29.
For a flavor of the rece ption that this rule receives, see the foll ow ing public c omment
posted to BIS by Un iversity of Florida professor Guido Mueller:
The conse que nces of thi s new rule on ou r rese arch will be disastrou s . . . . Adding an appl ica 
tion for a 'deeme d ex port license' for every foreign student for every high tech instrume nt will
further dimi nish our capabilities to conduct our rese arch . . . .
What a joke ! . . .
In my opinion the re are two ways out: the first is that you stop this BS . . .. The secon d opti on
is that we will st art buy ing inte rnational products . .. . [w]e are actually all owe d to use them.
Ple ase, do . . . your g reat cou ntry a great fav or and make su re that al l ou r students can work i n
our Ja bs with out havi ng t o go through another stupid . . . hu rdle.
Email from Guido Mueller. Assistant Professor, Un iversity of Florida, to the Bureau of Indu stry and
Secu rity (May 5, 2005), http://efoia.bi s.d oc.g ov/ pubc omm/Revi si on %20to%20the%20Deemed %20
Ex port%20Reg s%202005/FINAL%20DOCUMENT. pdf.
For one of many industry objection s t o the deemed ex port rule, see Cynthia J ohn son, Vice
Chair, Semiconductor Industry Associati on Ex port C ontrol s C ommittee, Deemed Export Policy: A
Worksh op on the IG' s Report to the De partment of C ommerce (May 6, 2005), http://
www7.nationalacademies.org/rscan s/C _J ohnson _IG _Presentation. pdf ("The deemed ex port rule
does n ot appear t o be a significant c ont ributor to national secu rity. At the same time, it di rectly
c onflicts with and impai rs efforts to maintain [U.S.] techn ol ogical leadership.").
30. See Seminars and Training, http://www.bis.doc.g ov/SeminarsAndTrain ing/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
3 1 . See Ex port Enfo rcement Prog ram, http://www.bis.doc.gov/Enfo rcement/ee prog rrn.htm
(last vi sited May 1 4, 2006). The significance is that BIS d oes n ot att ribute these outreach prog ram s
a s being de signed t o prevent businesse s from getting caught-which w ould b e the g oal if the export
enfo rcement mechan ism were n ot self-g overn ing -but a s designed to prevent damage to national
secu rity th rough preventing ex ports. This is a tac it rec ognition of the fact that BIS cann ot enforce
the regulation s re actively and that the onu s fall s to indu stry to prevent m ost . v iolati ons.
32. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., ANN. REP. F ISCAL YEAR 2003, at 2 1 -25 (2004) [hereinafte r
FY2003], available at http://www.bis.d oc.g ov/news/2004 i03AnnualRe pt/index.htm.
33. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., ANN. REP. F ISCAL YEAR 2004, at 2 1 -25 (2005), available at
http://www.bi s.doc.gov/news/2005/04Annua1Re pt/Cha pters I to7 .htm#ch2.
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year 2003 BIS recorded 12,443 license applications, a seventeen percent
34
increase over 2002. Yet total U.S. exports in 2003 increased only five per
35
cent over 2002. Unless we are to conclude that there was a remarkable
spike in controlled exports as a proportion of total exports, the increase in
license applications indicates that exporters were simply being more vigilant
in applying for licenses. Similarly, BIS recently began recording statistics
on preventive enforcement activities. In fiscal year 2003, the bureau com
pleted thirty-four administrative enforcement settlements for export control
violations,yet

through

aggressive

preventative

measures,

the

bureau
36

thwarted an additional 136 potential violations before they could occur.

This is a noteworthy success for the bureau, but it also underscores the sus
picion that self-regulation

is

necessary:

postviolation enforcement is

catching only a fraction of the potential violations.
In summary, the nature of the regulations and the evidence from BIS en
forcement efforts lead to the conclusion that export controls rely largely, in
fact almost entirely, on self-regulatory behavior by exporters. Most exports
are unlicensed, and even the licensed exports would overburden the en
forcement teams if every export had to be individually precleared. Thus the
burden is on the exporter to learn the regulations, to ensure compliance, and
to report appropriately. The burden therefore falls to the exporters to develop
a corporate compliance program. Part II considers the relationship between
corporate compliance and culpability.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A DMINISTRATIVE P ENALTIES
FOR EXPORT C ONTROL VIOLATIONS

Corporate punishment could potentially serve a number of objectives,
including deterring violations, condemning, imposing retribution for moral
blameworthiness, reforming

the

offending firm, or incapacitating the
37
In this Part, these competing j ustifi

wrongdoer from causing further harm.

cations for penalties are considered in light of the unusual nature of
exporting firms, first by considering the stated goals of BIS enforcement
efforts, then by considering in turn the nature of deterrence, rehabilitation,
incapacitation, and retribution as they apply specifically to export controls.
This Part argues that deterrence and rehabilitation, the stated goals of BIS,
are well suited to the nature of export control violations, but that incapacita
tion and retribution should not be entirely dismissed as motives for tailoring
enforcement actions to the compliance culture of the firm.

34.

FY2003, supra n ote 32, ch. 2.

35. U.S. INT'L. TRADE ADMIN. FOREIGN TRADE HIGHLIGHTS (2004),
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/industry/otea/usfth/aggregate/H03T06.html.
36.

available

at

FY2003, supra n ote 32.

37. In fact, the list of reasons to punish a c orporation can include any of the foll owing: fault
rationales, c oercive rati onales, ec on omic rationales, signaling rationales, retributive rationales, re
formative rationales, and c ompensatory rationales. See generallyRICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE
CRIME AND SENTENCING§§ 2.3 . 1 -2.3.7 ( 1 994).
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A. On the Record: Stated Goals of BIS
Before considering the possible theoretical j ustifications for imposing
penalties on offending firms, it is probably best to first consider the stated
objectives of the BIS enforcement division. The published goals of the De
partment of Commerce indicate that prevention and education of potential
violators are their obj ectives. In enforcing export control violations, "[t]he
primary roles of BIS's Export Enforcement program are to prevent the ille
gal export of dual-use items before they occur; investigate and assist in the
prosecution of violators of the [EAR] . . . and inform and educate exporters,
freight forwarders, and manufacturers of their enforcement responsibilities
38
under the EAR . . . ." Leaving aside the second objective, which as a ge
neric

commitment to

prosecuting

violations

could

be

viewed

as

a

commitment to any of the j ustifications for punishment, the other two stated
objectives of BIS are to prevent and to educate, with prevention noticeably
listed first.It is noteworthy that BIS does not make a distinction between
prevention by means of deterrence, by means of rehabilitation, or by means
39
of incapacitation. It is also reasonable to infer from the commitment to
education and information that BIS seeks to rehabilitate offending, or poten
tially offending, firms. These goals, along with other possible goals of
administrative penalties, will be considered in the sections that follow.
B. The Goal and Challenge of Deterrence
One likely justification for imposing administrative penalties on errant
40
organizations is to deter. The term deterrence as applied to a business en
tity is, to some extent, a paradox, since it implies a potential that cannot be
ascribed to a "fictional legal entity . . . [that] cannot itself be 'deterred.' ,,4i
At the very most, assigning culpability to an organization can deter those
42
individuals who comprise the organization or who act as its agents. In fact,
the existence of corporate liability can be supported in some cases on the
grounds that only by punishing the corporate actor can the true social costs
43
of transgression be internalized. Individual actors within the business en
tity are often "judgment-proof' in that they are unable to absorb the large
penalties that must be levied in order to make the deterrence effectively
more painful than the gain that would otherwise be realized by the organiza-

38. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC ., EXPORT ENFORCEMENT,
c om plianceandenforcement/index.htm (last visited M ar. 26, 2006).

http://www.bis.doc.g ov/

39.
For clarity, in this N ote the term deterrence will apply to intents to prevent behavi or
through a fear of penalties, the term rehabilitation will refer t o reforming offenders s o that there is
n o future desire to misbehave, and incapacitati on will refer to efforts to make future offenses impos
sible. See WAYNER. LAFAVE, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW§ 1.5 (2003).
40. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1493-96 (1996).
41.

Id. at 1494.

42.

Id. at 1494--95.

43.

Id.

tion.

44
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For example, the fines involved in administrative sanctions can range

up to hundreds of thousands of dollars, perhaps even millions if multiple
45
national security violations are committed. Most individuals are unable to
absorb the costs of such sanctions, so marginally increasing the sanction in
order to adjust deterrence has little effect, if any, on that actor. A simple ex
ample suffices: if the fine imposed for speeding were one million dollars,
the marginal deterrent effect on an individual of raising the fine to two mil
lion dollars would be minimal at best. The individual is said to be judgment
proof since either fine, one million or two million, is equally destructive; the
individual cannot internalize the cost of either fine. But the same marginal
increase in costs to a corporate entity that can internalize the cost makes a
46
difference to the entity in making compliance decisions.
Yet there is an alternative hypothesis. If we abandon the vision of the
corporation as a rational actor and replace it with a vision of the corporation
as a conglomeration of individual actors, then mathematical calculations
47
about corporate deterrence start to lose their appeal. Regardless of how well
the deterrent sanction is tailored to internalize the total social costs, the de
cisions that lead to violations still reside in managers and other agents who
might bring their own external costs and benefits to the decision-making
48
process. Executives do not always confine their decisions to the costs and
benefits that will accrue to the corporation's shareholders or other stake
49
holders.
Given that deterrence is a stated goal of administrative sanctions, there is
a dilemma in applying those sanctions-at least to the extent of finding the
appropriate target of deterrence. If deterrence is aimed at the individual de
cisionmaker, the risk is that there is no way to set the sanction high enough
to offset the total social cost and still be appropriate to individuals without
making them judgment-proof. If deterrence is aimed at the corporation as a
whole, the alternative risk is that the individual decisionmaker brings exter
nal costs and benefits to the decision that are not accounted for in setting
sanctions in relation to benefits, social costs, and expected probability of
punishment. Part V will return to this apparent tension between deterrence
of corporations and individuals and will argue that by focusing deterrent
efforts on particular key leadership positions, the tension can be resolved.

44.

V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards:

nally Liable?,

When Should Corporations Be Held Crimi

31 AM. CRIM. L.REV. 1239, 1243-44 (2000).

45.

See supra

46.

Khanna,

note 12.

supra

note 44, at 1244;

see also

J ohn C. C offee, Jr.,

"No Soul to Damn: No

Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment,

19 M ICH. L.

REV. 386, 389-90 (1981).
47.
Compare Coffee, supra n ote 46, at 393-94 (describing this behavi oral perspective) with
Khanna, supra note 44, at 1244 (discussing deterrence in mathemati cal terms).
48.

See C offee, supra note

46, at 393-405.

49.

See generally Timothy

L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious
13 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 173

Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes,

(1997). For a discussion of the distinction between shareh olders and stakeholders in the export
c ontext, see infra notes 105-117 and acc ompanying text.
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C. Goals in Conflict: Rehabilitation and Incapacitation
There is an inherent conflict in the tasks assigned to the Department of
Commerce that highlights the value of rehabilitation as a goal of corporate
punishment, as well as the danger of incapacitation. The Department of
Commerce wants exporters to thrive and grow, but only to the extent that
they are complying with controls on which technologies go to which desti
nation countries. In other contexts, punishment can be justified as a means
of incapacitating, or preventing the offender from committing further
5°
harm. For example, an incarcerated individual is no longer able to continue
committing crimes even if the individual is not reformed and not deterred by
the threat of future penalties. At least in theory, a company that has demon
strated a failure to adequately guard against the export of controlled
dangerous technology could be prevented from exporting. For example, the
firm could be denied any license to export controlled items for a period of
51
years. In a more extreme example, an administrative penalty that drives the
firm to insolvency would effectively amount to capital punishment of the
52
corporate actor, preventing future violations.
There are two basic problems with carrying this rationale too far. First,
as discussed in Part I, the government's ability to actually prevent most vio
53
lations of export controls is questionable. The volume of exports and the
relative scarcity of enforcement agents prevent the government from being
certain that every item leaving the United States is properly licensed. We
could certainly imagine a firm that, once denied export licenses, simply con
tinued to export in the shadow of an over-tasked enforcement regime. A
persistent and determined exporter--or even a merely inattentive one
could circumvent such a system since the system relies so heavily on pre
ventive actions of the exporter. This situation is significantly distinct from
the case of criminal incapacitation by imprisoning a dangerous felon. In the
case of an individual, the problem is reduced to separating one offender
from the remainder of society-a task that the modem penal system seems
capable of performing. Even assuming a regime that could effectively inca
pacitate the corporate actor, individuals live on even after the firm dies.
When XYZ, Inc. becomes insolvent, the chief executive and the export
manager are likely to find their way into PDQ, Inc., and the problem has
shifted, not disappeared.
The second problem with relying too heavily on an incapacitation ra
tionale for export controls is that the underlying behavior in question is
often something that we want to encourage. The export of U.S. goods and
technology is generally considered good for U.S. industry and the U.S.

50.

LAFAVE, supra not e 39,§ 1 .5.

51.

1 5 C.F.R.§ § 7 64.3(a)(2 ), 7 66.25 (2005 ).

52.

See, e.g.,

David Morris,

Capital Punishment for Corporations?,

PRESS, Sept. 22, 1998, at 9A.

53.

See supra notes

23-27 and ac companying text.
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54
economy. The Department of Commerce is in a conflicted pos1t1on,
charged with both generally encouraging exports and yet specifically pre
55
venting unlicensed exports. This leaves the incapacitation argument with
limited appeal.
In some cases a denial of export privileges could serve the interests of
preventing harm without significant costs to the economy, and it is easy to
understand the inclusion of denial orders as one tool of administrative sanc
56
tions in such cases. But widespread use of incapacitation as a justification
for punishment could eventually cause results that conflict with other goals
57
of the Department of Commerce, and of the United States as a whole.
These other goals place the Department of Commerce in the role of encour
aging and facilitating exports generally, making a case for corporate
rehabilitation as an objective of any punishment regime. Leaving aside so
cial science arguments that accompany such a discussion in the case of
58
individuals, it is at least possible that offending companies can be rehabili
tated.
Rehabilitation appears to have worked in the case of Hughes Electron
ics. After an alleged near miss on sharing satellite technology with the
59
People's Republic of China, H ughes took the initiative to empanel a com
mission to survey industry best practices in the creation of adequate internal
compliance programs, and then implemented the commission's results for
60
Its conclusions, the Nunn-Wolfowitz Task

its future export operations.

Force Report on Industry Best Practices, have proven to be a watershed
development

in

integrating

corporate

culture

and

export

control

54. RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., EcONOMICS 53 1-33, 7 72 -80 (HarperCollins College Pu b
lishers, 10th ed. 1993). Assuming that exports do not replace domestic cons umption, exports can be
expected to increase prod uction, GDP, and employment. See generally Valentino Piana, Exports,
Economics We b Institute (2001 ), http://www.economicswe binstitute.org/glossary/exports.htm.
55. The Department of Commerce recogni zes this in its strategic o bjective 1 .2: "Advance
responsi ble economic growth and trade while protecting American security." DE PT. OF COMMERCE,
STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY 2004-FY 2009, at 3 (n.d. ).
5 6. See, e.g., In re Ronald 0. Brown , No. 99-BXA-03 (Mar. 2, 2000). Mr. Brown was fin ed
$1 8,000 and denied export privileges for a period of three years a fter settling charges that he had
exported shotguns to R ussia in 1994. Although the export denial was suspended, the aggregate im
pact on the United States economy o f suspending Mr. Brown's budding entrepreneurship would
have been minor.
5 7. Compare id. with In re Federal Express Corp., Case No. E92 I (Oct. 4, 2005), available
http://efoia.bis.doc.gov/ExportContro1Violations/E921 .pdf, where FedEx settled an enforcement
action for accepting for international shipment a "package of used clothes" being exported by a
company that had been denied export privileges. The potential impact to the U.S. economy by shut 
ting down FedEx can only be speculated. Lest w e ass ume that another shipper would step into
FedEx's place, OHL settled the following day for exporting items on behalf of the same banned
party. In re DHL Holdings (USA) Inc. (Oct. 5, 2005 ), available at http://efoia. bis.doc.gov/
ExportControlViolations/E922.pdf.
at

58.
59.

LAFAVE, supra note 39, § l .5(b).

The rest of the soap opera plays out in Howard Diamond,
Cooperation with China, ARMS C ONTROL TODAY, May 1 998,
armscontrol.org/act/l 998_05/hd4my98.asp.

House Seeks to Limit Space
available

at

http://www.

60. NUNN-WOLFOWITZ TASK FORCE REPORT: INDUSTRY "BEST PRACTICES" REGARDING
EXPORT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 1 , (July 25, 2000) [hereinafter NUNN-WOLFOWITZ].
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61
compliance. Reforming inadequate controls is a rational and informed re
sponse to a noted failure to comply. Combined with penalties whose
magnitudes make individuals judgment-proof, the ability of an organization
to respond effectively to such failures and to seek out solutions provides at
least one argument in favor of punishing the corporation (rather than the
62
individual agent) in the first place.
D. The Odd Case for Retribution
There is even a potential value in adjusting punishment in order to im
pose retribution on the offending firm or to express condemnation. Granted,
punishing business entities for purposes of retribution faces some significant
63
criticism. The argument goes that the corporation--despite our desires to
vilify the institution-is a mindless entity composed of no more than the
sum of the actions of its components and agents. To punish such an entity, in
the sense of attaching moral blameworthiness to it, is to misunderstand its
nature. To ascribe moral deficiency to the corporation is not only to engage
in anthropomorphism but to ignore that the processes inherent in the corpo
64
ration stem from human decisions. In one eloquent description of this
dilemma, the problem is that business entities have "no soul to be damned,
65
and no body to be kicked[.] "
But we like to kick the corpses and damn the souls of firms that appear
to us to be particularly morally blameworthy. Contrast, for example, the
news coverage of the failure of Enron with the bankruptcy of Delphi. De
spite the fact that both represent corporate failures on a similar scope, one
was vilified and the other has so far been treated as any other (albeit disas
66
trously large) bankruptcy. After all, there are elements of similarity
between decision-making processes in humans and internal corporate deci
sionmaking that make the desire to express outrage or condemn particularly
bad behavior understandable. Although there is certainly a retributive argu
ment for singling out particular acts of individual agents of the corporation

61 .

See infra Part V.

62.

See

Khanna, supra note 44, at 1 245.

63. See Khanna, supra n ote 40, at 1 494 nn.91-93 (descri bing academic support for deter
rence and rehabilitati on rationales for c orp orate criminal liability, but leaving open the possi bility of
n on -dete rrent justificati ons for civil liabi lity).
64. See C offee, supra n ote 4 6, at 386 n.2 ("Long before Baron Thurl ow's time, ecclesiastical
c ourts had resp onded to c orporate misbehavior by imposing the decree of excommunicati on. This
proba bly represents the first occasi on on which the anthropomorphic fallacy that the c orporati on
was but an individual misled c ourts.").
65.

Id. at 3 8 6 (qu oting Edward, First Baron Thurl ow).

66. See, e.g., Press Release, Inte rnati onal Uni on, UAW Statement on Delphi filing for bank
ruptcy (Oct. 8, 2005), available at http://www.uaw. org/news/newsarticle.cfm ?Artld =34 6 (n oting
that "[t]he UAW is deeply disappointed" but reserving the UAW's criticism for recently reneg otiated
executive severance packages). But see Jill Stewart, Enron 's a Sideshow, SAN DIEGO C ITYBEAT,
http://www.sdcity beat.c om/article.php?id =2 1 8 6 ("Let's stipulate that Enron is evil . . . .") (last vis
ited Mar. 2 6, 200 6).
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for their wrongdoing, it is questionable how effective it might be to extend
67
that outrage to the corporate body itself.
Nevertheless, attaching a label of moral blameworthiness to an offend
ing exporter can serve the purpose of triggering reputational sanctions not
only against the company, but also against the individuals affiliated with it.
In this sense, attaching a label of moral significance to a blameworthy firm
allows sorting behavior in the market: other market actors can avoid interac
tion with particularly offensive players or a firm can be punished for the
68
company it keeps. For example, the harm to Arthur Andersen's reputation
from its role in the Enron failure led to a hemorrhage of clients and its even
69
tual dernise. Although there is a risk that such retributivist labeling might
be used irrationally, there is at least the possibility that ascribing moral
blameworthiness to an amoral entity provides valuable information to other
actors.
III. C OMPLIANCE C ULTURE AS A FACTOR I N PRIMARY LIABILITY
This P art begins with a deceptively simple question: how do you deter
mine the culpability of an organization? While the concept of organizational
culpability or liability is by no means novel, there has been a flourishing
interest in the topic in the wake of a number of highly publicized corporate
70
failures in the last several years. The first barrier to finding a simple defini
tion of corporate culpability lies in the layers of meaning that adhere to the
71
term "culpability" itself. This Part argues that considering internal compli
ance regimes cannot be relegated to a mere aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, but actually is a necessary component of considering the ma
jor factor of "degree of willfulness."
The penalty guidance that has now been added to the EAR includes as a
72
The

primary determining factor "the degree of willfulness" of the offense.

penalty guidance indicates that for cases where export violations occur due
to simple negligence or carelessness, a civil penalty or letter of warning will

67.

Al bert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frank
71 B.U. L. REv. 307, 3 1 1 - 1 3 (1 99 1 ); Khanna, supra note 40, at 1 494 n.9 1
("[T ]he n otion that s oc ie ty has a retributive need so great that it must punish n onhuman entit ies and
label them criminal, h owever, requ ires empirical support and seems implausible.").
See

pledge and Deodand,

68. I am indebted to Doug Chartier for rais ing th is interest ing aspect of retributive sanctions
in the c ontext of c orporate c ompliance.
69.

See

Fl oyd Norris, loss of Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1 1 , 2002, at A l 8.

70. For treatment of the historical devel opment of c orporate l iability, see Harvey L. Pitt &
Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second look at
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1 559, 1 5 66-67 (1990); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich,
Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its
Soul?,

47RUTGERS L. REv. 605 (1995); C offee, supra n ote 4 6.

71 .

See generally

Khanna, supra n ote 44.

72. Exp ort Admin istration Regulations: Penalty Guidance in the Settlement of Administra
t ive Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 78 67 (Fe b. 20, 2004) (to be c odified at 15 C. F.R. pts. 764 and
766).

1798

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 1 04:1 785

73
be sufficient in many cases. In cases of gross negligence, willful blindness
to the EAR, or knowing or willful violations of the regulations, the penalties
74
might be more severe, including denial of export privileges.
The difficulty with this approach i s in determining a degree o f willful
ness without considering the culture of compliance within the exporter
company. Assuming a case where there is no clear evidence of intent-for
example no mission statement that discusses how best to violate export laws
or a "smoking memo" that shows a knowing violation-one way to make
those fine distinctions between simple negligence and gross negligence is to
examine the internal procedures, or lack thereof, that led to the inadvertent
violation. It is logically incoherent to try to consider the willfulness of such
an act without considering the policies, procedures, and leadership failures
that made the violation possible.
An exporter might hope for guidance from BIS on how culpability will
be determined, but the penalty guidance itself acknowledges the difficulty of
defining the corporate state of mind. The best that a confused exporter can
get from the penalty guidance is the conclusory and circular logic that "BIS
may regard a violation of any provision of the EAR as knowing or willful if
75
the facts and circumstances of the case support that conclusion." BIS says
76
that ignoring the so-called "red flags" or "the nature and result of any in
77
quiry made by the party" indicate willful or knowing behavior. But these
may be isolated cases and provide little guidance to the exporter or the
judge.
These two positions are in some tension. On the one hand, lack of a req
uisite mental state does not preclude liability for the underlying strict
liability violation. But the penalty guidance, assuming a violation has oc
curred, places culpability at the forefront of the considerations for sanctions.
This administrative regime contrasts with criminal prosecution for such vio
lations, where there must be some intent. For example, the EAR specifically
78
limit criminal enforcement to cases of knowing or willful violation. Pun
ishment by administrative proceeding does not, on the surface, require such
culpability. For example, administrative enforcement proceedings are begun
with a formal charging letter that must, among other things, state that there
is reason to believe that a violation of the EAR has occurred, set out the es
sential facts of the alleged violation, give notice of sanctions available, and
79
explain the remedies available to the party charged with a violation. After

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

at 7867-7 1 .
at 787 1 .

76. Behavior by the foreign buyer that should raise s uspi cions-for example, a long-time
client, a small b akery that imports flour, tries to buy sophisti cated lasers.
77.
Export Administration Reg ulations: Penalty G uidance in the Settlement of Administra
tive Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 7867 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to be codified at 1 5 C.F.R. pts. 764 and
766).
78.

1 5 C. F.R. § 764.3 (2005).

79.

Id.

§ 766.3.
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discovery and hearings, the role of the administrative law judge is to deter
80
mine "whether there has been a violation." At no point in the process does
the regulation raise the possibility that exporters can raise a defense based
81
on a lack of intent.
In other contexts, corporate compliance programs can be viewed as a bar
to liability. Normally the acts of an employee or other agent are attributable
to the corporation if they are performed within the scope of employment
82
even if the acts are prohibited by company policy. By that logic, export
failures on the part of an employee contrary to stated company policy would
still be attributable to the company. But this need not be the case. Consider,
for example, employer vicarious liability for sexual harassment committed
83
While not

by its agents in the wake of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.

reversing the long-standing rule of agency law noted above, the Court held
out a theory of employer liability that allows a company to disavow actions
of subordinates provided that those actions were clearly contrary to well
stated and formulated policies: in the context of sexual harassment "a de
fending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages,
84
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence." That defense consists
of showing two elements: the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct the behavior, and the employee unreasonably failed to take pre
85

ventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.

Applying the logic of Burlington v. Ellerth to export violations invites
two significant objections. First, the Court explicitly limited the decision to
cases where there was no tangible detriment to the plaintiff. When an agent
takes tangible employment action, the employer cannot escape liability by
86
noting a well-drafted and thorough company policy. Therefore the Burling
ton logic might not perfectly stretch to include export actions that clearly are
imputed to the company despite contrary policies. Second, Burlington's
reach might also be limited by the Court's reliance on the fact that one in
tended benefit of Title VII was to encourage companies to create grievance
87
procedures and reporting methods. On the other hand, BIS has stated a

80.

ld.§ 766.17.

There i s at least some s upport fo r a requirement of intent in the revised penalty guidance
found at 69 Fed. Reg. 7867. The discussion of culpa bility notes the distinction between penalties for
wil lful and intentional violations and contrasts them with negligent violations. Id. at 7871. The
absence of discussion of appropriate sanctions for violations that do not even rise to the level of
negligence might be interpreted to mean that such violations are not punishable. In light of the re
mainder of 1 5 C. F.R.§ 766 (2005), such a conclusion is probably not warranted.
81.

82.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 230 ( 1 958). For a discussion of the value of considering corporate compliance programs as a bar to liability, see Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 70.
83.

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 ( 1 998).

84.

Id. at 765.

85.

Id.

86.

Id. at 762-63.

87.

Id. at 764.
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desire to encourage the creation of similar reporting and grievance proce
ss
dures by exporters. In that sense, Burlington remains informative.
Despite the apparent relevance of corporate compliance to liability, the
use of company policies in this context is the exception rather than the
s9
rule. This need not be the case. There are several reasons that allowing
corporate compliance culture as a defense to liability would be favorable. As
corporations are coming to be viewed more frequently as rational actors that
90
respond to deterrence and other costs and benefits, use of compliance to
91
disprove mens re � fits within traditional notions of criminal defense. Fur

ther,

encouraging

corporate compliance

programs

will

increase self

regulation, encourage good corporate citizenship, and is a cost effective
method of regulation not only for the corporation but also for enforcement
92
agencies.
•

Corporate compliance programs provide a particularly relevant method
of investigating the extent to which a corporation is culpable. Although such
a program could be viewed as an outright defense to liability, the value of
considering the program even after a determination of liability clearly has
merits. Even if we assume that export controls are strict liability offenses,
the stated priority of BIS in considering the "degree of willfulness" of the
business entity cannot be easily divorced from the requirement to consider
the ways that the corporation has attempted to prevent such violations.
Unless we are to assume that the penalty guidance regarding "the facts and
93
circumstances of the case" is a purely arbitrary and standardless invitation
to the enforcement agency, there must be some method to determine corpo
rate willfulness. Even in that light, compliance regimes cannot be relegated
to the role of aggravating or mitigating factors-they must inform the proc
ess of making the primary decision on culpability.
IV. TH E ROLE OF CORPORATE C U LTURE IN ACHIEVI NG
THE GOALS OF P UNISHMENT

There is a second reason why compliance programs ought to be consid
ered early in the penalty phase. The history of such programs indicates that
they are particularly well-suited to the role of deterrence in self-regulating
industries. While the specifics of export industries might seem unique in
88. See, e.g., B UREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., EXPORT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, http://
www.bis.doc.gov/ComplianceAndEnforcement/ExportManagementSystems.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 200 6) ("An EMS can . . . [r]einforce senior management commitment to comply with U.S. ex
port laws and regulations to all parts of the company . . . [and s]erve as a vehicle to communicate
red flag indicators that raise questions about the legitimacy of a customer or transaction.").
89.

See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 70, at 662-66.

90.

See Khanna, supra note 44, at 1 243-45 ; Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70.

91.

See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 70, a t 676-77.

92. Id. at 678-80 (arguing that compliance programs encourage self-regulation); id. at 6808 1 (arguing that they encourage good corporate citizenship); id. at 68 1-84 (arguing that compliance
programs are cost effective for the regulators and the regulated).
93.

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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many ways, there are significant ways in which the problems faced b y com
panies in these endeavors mirror the problems that other industries have
faced. Comparing exporting with these other industries shows that the same
concerns and requirements that led to the widespread use of corporate cul
ture programs in those industries are persuasive for exporters.
Current reliance on corporate compliance· programs can be traced to a
series of corporate governance failures during the second half of the twenti
94
eth century. Some of the earliest, and still most widespread, uses of
95
corporate compliance codes have been in the field of antitrust, but subse
quent scandals have led companies to expand these codes of conduct to
include foreign corrupt practices, insider trading, racketeering, defense con
96
tracting, and even participation in clinical medical trials.
The trend did not end at the conclusion of the twentieth century. In the
wake of several corporate financial scandals, corporate governance attention
97
has been refocused on financial improprieties. The problem, of course, is
not new. In their preface to the best practices report for Hughes Electron
98
ics, Senator Nunn and Ambassador Wolfowitz noted the influence of such
ideas in the mid- 1 990s as reflected in In re Caremark International Inc. De
99
rivative Litigation. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing,
corporate practices in financial statements have simply received new scru
tiny. The provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act suggest that this will not be a
1 00
passing trend. Although the scope of this Note is limited to administrative
enforcement actions, it is also noteworthy that the United States Sentencing
Commission has made effective compliance programs a relevant factor for
criminal sentencing of organizations as well.

to'

The common element in these scandals and the reactions to them has
been the recurrent return to corporate compliance methods in order to fix the

94.

Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70, at 1 575-78.

95.

Id. at 1 5 8 1 -82.

96.

Id. at 1574-1 600.

97.

See generally

TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING

INSTITUTION (2001 ) .

98.

See supra note

60 and accompanying text.

99. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1 996). In Caremark, a derivative lawsuit was brought based on
the board's failure to discover that employees were breaking the law. The court held that "without
assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist . . . that are reasonably designed to
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information . . . to reach in
formed judgments concerning both the corporation's compliance with law and its business
performance[,]" the directors failed in their obligation to the shareholders. Id. at 970. But the direc
tors may escape liability if there is a reporting system that "is in concept and design adequate to
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a
matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its responsibility." Id.
1 00. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, 1 16 Stat. 745.
101.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 8B2 . l (2005).
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damage that had been done and, significantly, to deter future failures .

102

Consider, for example, General Electric's ("GE") defense of price fixing
charges in the 1 950s. In the face of evidence of widespread willful antitrust
behavior, GE considered relying on its antitrust corporate compliance pro
gram as a defense. Although GE ultimately chose not to raise that defense
and paid significant fines, the industry scrambled to implement similar pro
103
grams. Significantly, empirical evidence suggests but does not prove that
these programs are effective at preventing antitrust violations. Just as sexual
harassment compliance programs are now recognized as having a deterrent

effect in that field, 1 04 antitrust compliance has been increased through corpo

rate governance programs that reward competitive behavior and establish
105
internal and external reporting procedures.
Corporate compliance is used to deter violations across a disparate array
of regulations from sexual harassment to antitrust and corporate financial
impropriety. Far more significant than the differences are the similarities
106
among these areas of corporate behavior. For example, as with sexual har
assment and honesty in accounting, we want companies to be largely self
regulating. The burden falls to the company, whether it is trying to prevent
agents from committing harassment or from falsifying financial records. As
with sexual harassment and price fixing, the activities involved are not eas
ily exposed without positive steps from either the corporation itself or from
an individual empowered to bring impropriety to light. Many of the activi
ties present a company with competing interests that tug at compliance from
several directions. In some cases a failure to comply opens up potential
profit for the company; in others failure to comply will have an effect on the
security or reputation of the United States; and in some cases failure to
comply will result in harm to third party interests. In these respects, all of
these areas of the law share at least some characteristics with export control
compliance .
V. T H E EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY B RIDGE
Even considering that export controls are self-regulatory, that the types
of behavior that we seek to encourage from exporters are well-suited to de-

1 02. Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70, at 1 574 ("A short summary of each scandal reveals
that codes of conduct consistently have been touted by corporations and their adversaries as a means
to avoid further misconduct.").
1 03 .

Id. at 1 578-8 1 .

1 04.

S e e supra

notes 83-85 and accompanying text.

1 05 . Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 70, a t 1 5 81-82. However, i t should be noted that the
decline in antitrust violations might be limited only to "irrational" antitrust violations, those viola
tions that were made out of ignorance instead of a rational cost-benefit analysis of compliance or
violation. Id.
1 06. Significantly, there are fewer tools available to enforce export controls compared to other
areas of regulation: competitors are unlikely to have a civil cause of action, there are no legislative
incentives giving third parties standing to enforce, and there are no treble damages provisions.
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terrence and rehabilitation, 1 07 and that a heavy emphasis on corporate com
pliance has found support in many other areas of corporate governance with
8

positive results, 10 it is not compelling simply to advocate a quick look at
corporate policy to determine liability or penalties. There are several areas
of tension in the foregoing observations, and it is these areas of tension that
this Part will address. Specifically, the role of senior leadership-managers
and boards of directors-in creating a culture of compliance provides a fo
cal point for matching the goals of the administrative penalty and the nature
of export control failures. This Part argues that the role of senior leadership
bridges the gap between the judgment-proof individual and the corporate
actor and merits the closest scrutiny in considering whether compliance is
adequate.
Simply advocating a strong reliance on corporate compliance runs into
several areas where there are tensions between theoretical considerations
and how we might expect industry to behave. The first such tension was
touched upon, briefly, in Part IL There is an unresolved question of whether
the corporation is best viewed as a rational actor or as a collection of human
1()<)
actors who act sometimes rationally and sometimes irrationally. A deter
rence theory that considers one and not the other will at best be only
partially effective. A second tension comes out of the distinction, found in
Burlington, among other sources, between the view of the company as a
principal, accountable for the conduct of its employee-agents, and the view
of the company as standing (at least in some cases) above the employees
1
and able to divest itself of responsibility for their actions. w Another tension,
related to the first two, arises from strict liability violations where some
level of culpability is considered in determining a penalty.
If export control regulations require a significant measure of self
regulating behavior, and if the goals of enforcement activities must include
deterrence among the justifications, if not as the primary justification, then
how do we structure the penalty? It is one thing to say, as in Part III, that we
should make the corporate compliance culture the starting point for looking
at culpability. It is another to say how that translates into applying the law to
a hypothetical violator. It is the senior executives and the board of directors,
from whom corporate compliance stems and to whom accountability is as
signed, who can best help resolve some of the tensions identified above.
The role of the leadership, as a component of a failure to comply with
regulations, is twofold: first, the executive is accountable for maximizing
corporate performance; second, the executive is responsible for balancing
111
the needs of competing stakeholders in the company. Under one view of
export control failures, we could view the executive as the manager who
107.

Supra Part II.

108.

Supra

109.

See, e.g.,

Misconduct,

Part IV.

Richard S. Gruner, Risk and Response: Organizational Due Care to Prevent
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613 , 61 6- 1 9 (2004); Khanna, supra note 44, at 1 243-44.

1 10.

See supra notes 82-87 and

1 1 1.

See, e.g.,

accompanying text.

Fort, supra note 49; Gruner, supra note 1 09.
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needs to fix a broken system. The focus then would be how to tailor en
forcement so as to maximize executive involvement and accountability for
1 12
and that
that system. Assuming that most managers want to obey the law,
the compliance regimes discussed in Parts III and IV are in place, evaluating
corporate noncompliance can be viewed in a way similar to many other
management failures.
This "defect" in performance can be traced to one or more of several po
tential causes within the organization. Individuals within management might
direct employees toward illegal activity, management might fail to educate
or motivate employees about lawful conduct, management responses to vio
lations might not correct known problems, or the violation could have been
1 13
an unforeseen by-product of legitimate corporate behavior.
In all of these
cases, the violation raises the question of what procedures were in place to
prevent such lapses, and how diligent group leaders were in appropriately
applying the procedures.
The frrst of these failures represents an extreme case. Self-regulation
breaks down in such cases, where management intentionally directs subor
dinates to violate export controls. These cases are well-suited for criminal
1 14
The other three failure modes cannot be addressed without

prosecution.

directly inquiring into the role that management plays within the compliance
structure. For example, if the failure lies in failing to motivate employees to
obey the law, the cause and remedy cannot be judged purely on the basis of
whether there is a stated policy of control compliance. To borrow from re
cent financial scandals, the document shredding at Enron and Arthur
Andersen violated written policies in both companies, yet it was encour
11 5
aged-if not demanded-by executives.
Likewise, if the failure of the
company stems from a management failure to respond to a known problem,
1 16
the existence of informal reporting procedures is not an adequate defense.
Such a view of export control violations as a manageable defect of an
executive's performance can help resolve some of the tensions that exist

1 1 2. GRUNER, supra note 37, § 1 . 10. 1 . Admittedly, this view would not provide guidance in
rare circumstances where a sizeable portion of the senior leadership of the business entity intention
ally encourage, or cause, violations to occur. In such cases, the value of considering the deterrence
effect of administrative sanctions under the EAR becomes less significant, and the facts would more
likely indicate criminal prosecution.
1 1 3.

Id. § I . I0.2.

1 14. In fact, BIS specifically notes such cases as being excellent candidates for concurrent
administrative cases and criminal prosecution. Export Administration Regulations: Penalty Guid
ance in the Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases, 69 Fed. Reg. 7867 (Feb. 20, 2004) (to
be codified at 1 5 C.F.R. pts. 764 and 766).
1 15.

I assume here for the purpose of argument that the facts alleged at trial in United States v.
No. H-02- 1 2 1 , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26870 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2002), are
true despite the Supreme Court's reversal for faulty jury instructions. Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 54 1 U.S. 696 (2005).

Arthur Andersen LLP,

1 1 6. Compare such a case with the logic of Burlington Industries Inc. v. El/erth: the two
prong test for a company to escape liability requires that the company has reporting procedures in
place and that the plaintiff exhausted those procedures. The parallels to export controls are clear: use
of compliance procedures has to be tempered by the extent to which failures within the organization
are acted upon. 524 U.S. 742 ( 1 998).
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between corporate deterrence and individual action. But it does not account
for the fact that the business can be making a rational export decision that
simply fails to comply. A second view of corporate ethics failures can re
solve some of the other tensions. An export offense might appear to be a
purely rational decision. After all, the benefits of compliance with export
controls accrue to society as a whole, while the costs of noncompliance are
1 11
not fully internalized to the firm. Here the failure to comply can be seen as
a failure to account for stakeholders whose daily influence is not felt in the
1 18
corporation.
•

In some ways, the export controls in the EAR are a way of internalizing
the needs of particular discrete non-shareholder stakeholders-the United
States government and society at large-into the decision-making process.
Indeed, the influence and values of external stakeholders-those who have a
vested interest in the activities of the corporation that transcends revenue,
balance sheets, and profit-are a valid constraint on the performance of the
company. The view of corporate violation as a failure to internalize the ex
ternal stakeholders provides a counterpoint to the view of the offense as a
failure to maximize performance. The common aspect of both, however, is
the key role that the senior leadership plays in assembling the competing
goals, creating the process that will tum goals into accomplishments, creat
ing the institutional channels for feedback, and monitoring the system.
Compare, for example, the role that non-shareholder stakeholders play
1 19
The plaintiff, a stockholder in the defendant base

in Shlensky v. Wrigley.

ball club, made a series of allegations in a shareholder derivative suit. Mr.
Wrigley, despite shocking financial losses that were unrivalled in all of Ma
jor League Baseball, believed that "baseball is a 'daytime sport' and that the
installation of lights and night baseball games [would] have a deteriorating
12 0
effect upon the surrounding neighborhood." The complaint alleged that the
failure to install lights in Wrigley Field was causing financial ruin. The evi
dence, as pleaded by the plaintiff, painted a bleak picture indeed for the
Cubbies.Although White Sox attendance was the same for games during the
weekend, White Sox attendance far exceeded Cubs attendance during the
121
week, when the Cubs played during the day and the Sox played at night.
The beleaguered Cubs even had to endure the fact that attendance at Cubs
122
games on the road outpaced attendance at home. The solution, from a

1 1 7.

Compare

Khanna, supra note 44,

with

Gruner, supra note 109.

1 1 8. To clarify the distinction: a shareholder is a legal person who owns some fraction of the
firm in question. By contrast, a stakeholder is any entity that has a significant interest in the actions
of the firm. So although all shareholders can be presumed to be stakeholders, the latter category is
significantly more expansive. Among the latter would be the government, the neighbors of the firm
in question, customers, vendors, employees, alliances, and perhaps even competitor firms. See Fort,
supra note 49.
1 19.

237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).

1 20.

Id. at 778.

121.

Id.

1 22.

Id.
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financial perspective, was clear: lights and night games were the way of the
123
future.
Mr. Wrigley, of course, would have none of it. And the court, in
finding for the defendant, held that the obligation of the director to ensure
financial returns for the shareholders was only one of many obligations: the
obligation to the surrounding neighborhood might equally be in the interests
1 24
of the corporation.
To reconcile the views of corporate culture, as expressed by BIS in its
model Export Management System (EMS), with the views of corporate cul
ture as a viable evaluation of culpability for the purposes of deterring export
violations would require a renewed emphasis on leadership accountability.
As noted above, the apparent tension between the corporation as rational
actor and the corporation as a collection of potentially irrational individuals
center around the leadership and accountability of executives. It is only
through active involvement of senior leaders in preventing violations that a
12 5
system of compliance as a defense to liability makes sense.
The distinction between a compliance program and a compliance culture
resurfaces time and again, from Burlington to Caremark and at points in
between. These distinctions are made clear in contrasting the view of execu
tive leadership found in the EMS guidelines that BIS has published and the
view of executive leadership found in the Nunn-Wolfowitz report. While
both sources speak to the value, in fact the necessity, of leadership account
ability, it is Nunn- Wolfowitz that suggests that the compliance committee
1 26
Not only does this approach speak

report directly to the board of directors.

to the concerns found in Caremark, but it also helps to bring into focus the
121

obligations to stakeholders outside of the company.

Other distinctions between Nunn-Wolfowitz and EMS are subtle, but
present. EMS stresses that managers should make a policy statement, pref
12 8
erably in writing.
The management should reiterate to employees, at least
129
on an annual basis, that they are committed to export control compliance.
Contrast this with the language from Nunn- Wolfowitz: "[s]enior manage
ment must . . . place constant emphasis on . . . compliance and take every
1 30

reasonably available opportunity to reiterate" this commitment.

123.

Id.

1 24.

Id.

at 780-8 1 .

1 25. By analogy: Burlington v. Ellerth does not stand for the proposition that any compliance
system is a bar to liability, but that employers must show, as part of an affirmative defense, that they
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly" the offending behavior. 524 U.S. 742,
765 ( 1 998).
126.

NUNN-WOLFOWITZ, supra note 60, at 1 1 .

127.

In re

Caremark Int'! Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1 996).

1 28.

BUREAU OF I NDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ELEMENT 1: MANAGEMENT
COMMITMENT POLICY, http://www.bis.doc.gov/exportmanagementsystems/pdf/admin 1 .pdf. (last

visited May 1 2, 2006.)
1 29.

Id.

1 30.

N UNN-WOLFOWITZ, supra note 60, at 8.
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A further example of the divide between the compliance culture as
viewed by the EMS and by the Nunn- Wolfowitz best practices is in training.
EMS recommends that the firm conduct export control training for all em
131
B ut Nunn

ployees who will be involved in export-related functions.

Wolfowitz goes further, encouraging a best practice that provides initial
training and periodic reinforcement of the message to all employees, and
132
then focuses the message on those employees involved in exporting. The
best practices also go above and beyond the EMS with respect to the breadth
and scope of desired training. Nunn- Wolfowitz makes the point of emphasiz
ing periodic training even for the board of directors, including for a
133
compliance committee thereof.
No parallel provision appears in the
134
EMS.
What lessons are to be drawn from this quick survey of the role of the
executive? One would be that Hughes Electronics, and their best practices
task force, appear to have learned the lessons that were hard-learned by the
other industries that came before. From sexual harassment and antitrust to
accounting improprieties and social responsibility beyond the shareholder,
corporate performance is maximized and violations minimized not merely
when a compliance program is created, but also when a compliance culture
is created. The executive embodies the point where the tension between the
corporation as a legal person and the absence of traditional mens rea is fo
cused. Although the executive has proven to occasionally be the source of
violations, there are equally compelling examples where the executive built
the necessary culture that prevented inadvertent violations of standards.
C ONCLUSION

Export controls are complex rules that span multiple government agen
cies, have various competing objectives, and are found in numerous sources.
Successfully navigating these regulations is made all the more difficult by
the fact that companies are under an obligation to self-regulate. Fundamen
tally, it is the leadership that is responsible for creating a culture of
compliance and ensuring that violations do not occur. When violations do
happen, BIS is faced with the need to use postviolation enforcement to try to
deter future offenses while still encouraging legitimate exports to fuel the
U.S. economy.
The EAR enforcement provisions allow BIS to consider corporate com
pliance

as

an

aggravating

or

mitigating

factor

once

culpability

is

determined. In many respects, this is backwards. Understanding the role of
corporate compliance culture is in fact a necessary prerequisite for deter
mining the corporate "degree of willfulness." Even if this were not so,

131.
BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ELEMENT 4: TRAINING (200 1 ),
http://www.bis.doc.gov/exportmanagementsystems/pdf/admin4.pdf [hereinafter EMS ELEMENT 4].
1 32.

NUNN-WOLFOWITZ, supra note 60, at 19-2 1 .

at 1 8.

1 33.

Id.

1 34.

EMS ELEMENT 4, supra note 1 3 1 .
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decades of experience with similar regulatory enforcement problems has
shown repeatedly that it is the extent and effectiveness of compliance pro
grams that bears most heavily on adequate deterrence.
The answer cannot stop at considering the existence and effectiveness of
compliance programs. These complex questions of how and why companies
act as they do cannot be reduced to such a simple model. But by bringing
the individual into the equation, in the form of executive buy-in and culpa
bility, BIS could start to resolve these tensions. The methods are effective in
other areas of regulatory compliance, and could be applied in export con
trols as well.

